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Introduction
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have enjoyed increasing popularity in Western Europe (Cedroni & Garzia, 2010) . These on-line tools provide citizens with voting advice based on a comparison between the respondents' and the parties' opinion on a number of actual policy statements. Their popularity has spurred debate among political scientists about their methodology and the validity of their advice. Most debates concern the way in which party positions are determined and the answers voters can give (agree/disagree or a scale).
Surprisingly, the elements that are central to all VAAs, the statements, have received less attention.
Prior research has found that statement selection-the set of statements presented to parties and voters-has consequences for the advice users get (Walgrave, Nuytemans, & Pepermans, 2009) . Statement selection makes a difference. This paper goes further and gauges which features of a specific selection of statements matter for which parties, and how these interact with features of users and parties. We examine whether some parties benefit from a given selection of statements (more voters are given the message that the party matches their preferences) while others stand to lose (more voters get the signal that the party is a bad match). We also examine how statement selection affects the matching of specific voters to specific parties.
To accomplish this task, we need a benchmark. Even without a benchmark we could still compare aggregate VAA outputs with the actual election results, for example, and assess how parties' aggregate scores in VAAs relying on different statement selections relate to their actual electoral strength. However, since VAAs are exclusively geared towards issues and ignore all other voter motives, using actual election results as a benchmark is not a good idea.
We rely on a classic mainstream theory of issue voting: the proximity model. It provides hypotheses about which parties should gain/lose with a specific batch of statements and generates expectations about which type of voter is matched with which type of party by which type of statement selection. Since many VAAs include issue salience-the importance of an issue to either voters or parties-in their calculations we also test its impact on VAA results.
We use data from a 2007 real-world VAA (Do the Vote Test) created in the Flemish region of Belgium and sponsored by the public broadcaster VRT. The final VAA consisted of 36 statements, but the builders tested a total of 50 statements. In this paper, out of the initial 50 statements, we take a random sample of 500 statement selections each consisting of 36 statements. Drawing on a sample of Belgian voters who took a survey answering all 50 issue statements we test to what extent statement selection makes a difference for the different Belgian (Flemish) parties and how statement selection affects the matching of voters to parties.
Statement selection in VAAs
Because they provide the information needed to match voters to parties, statements are the building blocks of all VAA calculations. But research on their effect is scarce. Statement selection has an effect on individual results as well as on the aggregate output across all users.
VAAs differ in the number of statements upon which they calculate their output (Wagner & Ruusuvirta, 2012) . However, to select which statements are used, different criteria can be used. Statements should be clear and unambiguous. VAA builders agree that statements should cover current political debates. Also, since statements should discriminate between parties, it is useless to incorporate statements on which all parties (dis)agree.
Furthermore, VAA builders aim for statements that are dispersed across issue domains.
Finally, VAA builders also, implicitly or explicitly, link their selection to a theoretical issuespace defined by several dimensions. All statement selection choices are bound to have an effect on the output. Depending on the criterion -distinguishing parties from one another, preferring statements that load on a dimension, or another consideration -the statement selection will be different.
In the only academic publication on the subject, based on the same Belgian VAA we study here, Walgrave et al. (2009) show that VAA output differs greatly depending on the selection of statements, with parties receiving an 'advice' seven times as often in one batch of statements as in another. Some of these variations are undoubtedly random, since adding or removing any statement is bound to affect the output. However, in this study we depart from the idea that certain statement selection properties systematically (dis)advantage certain parties and that some are better in matching specific voters to specific parties. Walgrave et al. (2009) found that statement selection matters but did not specify which characteristics of statement selections lead to advantages or disadvantages for which parties, nor did they examine whether statement selections differ in their capacity to connect voters to the 'correct' party.
Proximity voting and the left-right dimension
In investigating the effect of statement selection, we draw on the proximity model of voting.
The proximity model positions voters and parties on an underlying dimension and assumes that issue positions of parties give voters cues about parties' positions on that dimension.
Voters minimize the distance between themselves and their party and cast a ballot for the closest party (Enelow & Hinich, 1984; Henning & Hinich, 2007; Merrill & Grofman, 1997) .
Most VAAs emulate models of proximity voting (Wagner & Ruusuvirta, 2012) . The more statements a voter and party agree upon, the smaller the distance and the higher the score of that party for that voter.
The left-right dimension is familiar to many voters and is the key cleavage in most party systems. Voters and parties can easily be positioned on it (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990; Huber & Powell, 1994) . The left-right dimension is often said to consist of two subdimensions. The first is the socio-economic left-right dimension (Lane & Ersson, 1987) . It has been supplemented with a new dimension that does not revolve around economic growth, but rather opposes supporters and critics of post-materialist values such as self-actualization, global responsibility, and aesthetic needs (Inglehart, 1990) . Given various names (Dalton, 1996; Kitschelt, 1994) , we define this second dimension as cultural left-right (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002) .
Many parties are rooted in these left-right cleavages; their electoral fate depends on the vividness of 'their' conflict. When more statements in a VAA are relevant to the dimension on which the party holds a strong-a clear and extreme-position, the party should score higher. So, if the left-right cleavage, socio-economically or culturally, is a party's core business, we expect it to fare better when more statements deal with it. Note that VAA builders are constrained by a limited number of statements. Including more left-right statements results in fewer statements on other dimensions (e.g., in the Belgian context, there is the linguistic cleavage between Flemings and Francophones or the old cleavage between Catholics and freethinkers). In light of these considerations, our initial hypotheses can be formulated as follows: The share of left-right statements in a VAA affects not only the aggregate score of parties but also the extent to which VAAs manage to link left-or right-wing voters to left-or right-wing parties. Respondents' positions in VAAs are often internally inconsistent (citation removed). Voters oppose increasing taxes and at the same time refuse to accept budget cuts.
Parties, in contrast, have to deal with trade-offs and need to present a balanced program as they are subject to public scrutiny. Respondents can simply take the best of both worlds and not align themselves with one side. The inclusion of more left-right statements should therefore lead to a higher score of left-or right-wing parties among clearly left-and rightwing voters. More left-right statements should increase a VAA's ability to match left-wing voters to left-wing parties, and the same applies to right-wing voters and parties. 
Issue salience
Most VAAs allow users to indicate which issues are especially important to them and statements on those issues are given greater weight. Some VAAs also weight statements on the parties' side, on the basis, for example, of party manifestos. If parties devote a great deal of attention to an issue, then the agreement with voters on a statement covering it will have a greater weight compared to statements dealing with secondary issues. Hence, VAAs often incorporate aspects of the issue salience model. The issue salience (or issue ownership) model is not based on the idea that voters vote for parties whose position they share (proximity) but rather for parties with whom they share a similar issue prioritization. Issue ownership refers to the fact that voters link certain parties to certain issues. Ownership is more likely to make voters vote for the issue-owning parties if those voters consider the issue to be important (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Walgrave, Lefevere, & Tresch, 2012) . When the issues that a party owns become more salient, that party benefits (Petrocik, 1996) . Note that VAAs in essence rely on positional issues to which the salience aspect is added. VAAs do not include valence issues as these do not allow VAAs to distinguish parties. Still, most VAAs are not based only on the logic of proximity voting but also incorporate elements of the saliency model (Wagner & Ruusuvirta, 2012) .
We expect VAA outputs to accord with the expectations put forth by the saliency model. Issue ownership theory holds that parties experience an across-the-board advantage on issues they own. Arising out of a history of attention to an issue (Petrocik 1996) , issue ownership refers to the long-term salience of issues for parties. With regard to parties, we focus on issue ownership since we have a good measure of this concept; however, we see no a priori reason to assume that our expectation would not apply for the more general concept of party salience. Issue ownership should have the largest effect on voters who care about the issue most. There is a well-documented effect of voter salience combined with issueownership perceptions on vote choice (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Walgrave et al., 2012 (parties) * 500 (selections) = 4.5 million data points.
As some respondents differ in their general agreement to all parties regardless of which selection was made, all scores are clustered, at the highest level of clustering, by respondent. Each respondent's 4,500 scores (500 selections * 9 parties) are taken as one cluster. Within each respondent, another cluster is added for the 9 parties: regardless of the selection that was made, some parties do better among some respondents. So, each party has 500 observations within each respondent. The lowest clustering level is the level of the 500 selections. We are mainly interested in variance at this lowest level: the between-selection 2 The final selection of statements used in DVT was based on the pretest. Basically, the creators try to come up with a statement selection that passes four criteria: the selection should cover the various issue domains equally, it should discriminate between all parties, it should not disproportionally (dis)advantage parties, and it should match at least a part of the electorate with the party they would vote for. 3 The party weights are calculated based on the per cent of (semi-)sentences in the party program covering an issue; the voter weights are based on a survey question on which issues the respondent felt where most important. Adjustments made by the weights for each statement separately are small and do not shift the importance much (weights per statement are typically between 1 and 1.2).
variance. For each party-respondent combination this tells us whether, depending on the selection, the party scores better or worse for that respondent.
Each party scores a certain result for each respondent in each selection. This absolute party score is not what we were interested in; it means little that a party's score increases if all other parties gain as well. We were interested in the extent to which a party's score increases or decreases compared to the score of the other parties. Does the party pull away from the pack, or not? Therefore we first calculated, for each selection and each respondent separately, the mean score of the nine parties and then subtracted this mean score from the absolute score of each party. This yields what we call the parties' Mean Relative Score (MRS). This relative score tells us, for a given respondent and given selection, whether the party is leading (positive score) or trailing (negative score) compared to the mean party score for that selection and it tells us and how big the lead or setback is. This relative score is the dependent variable in our estimations.
Independent variables are situated at either the respondent, party or selection level. The survey included an issue-salience measure at the respondent level. Out of a list of fourteen issues, respondents were asked to tick a maximum of three issues they found particularly important. The fifty statements are matched to the fourteen issues so that we have a salience measure for each statement: important statements get a score of 1, the others 0.
These scores were then summed for each respondent and each selection. As a result, we have a measure of how important the issues in a certain selection are for this respondent.
At the party level, we use the parties' left-right position as determined by the Chapel Hill expert survey of 2006 (Hooghe et al., 2002) . These data do not provide cultural left-right measures separately, so we use the general left-right dimension as a proxy. For three parties no measures were available: we inferred the scores for these parties based on our reading of their manifestoes and communication: LDD was decidedly more economic and culturally right-wing than the traditional liberal party Open VLD, but not as extreme as the extreme-right party VB. Spirit was in an electoral alliance with the Socialists, so we assigned them identical scores; identical reasoning was followed for N-VA being in an electoral alliance with CD&V.
Based on the 2009 Partirep survey (Deschouwer, Delwit, Hooghe, & Walgrave, 2010) , in which voters were asked to indicate which party they primarily associated with a range of issues, each party received an issue ownership score for each selection. First, we tallied the percent of voters associating each issue with each party. Then, this score was multiplied by the number of statements on the issue in a given selection. Finally, all separate issueownership scores were summed across all statements in a selection. The resulting variable indicates the extent to which the party owned the issues covered by the statements in a selection.
At the selection level, we calculated the absolute number of cultural/economic leftright statements per selection 4 .
We use fixed effects multi-level models accounting for the clustered nature of our dataset (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002) . The models mirror the hierarchical nature of the dataset, with respondents being the highest level, then parties, and then selections. For readability of the coefficients, we multiply the dependent variable by 100.
Results
Across all respondents, do certain parties fare better than others? Consider the average relative scores per party (MRS) and their standard deviation across the random sample of 500 statement selections in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 estimates the direct effects of all variables, Model 2 adds two-way interactions, and Model 3 three-way interactions. It is these three-way interactions in Model 3 that we are interested in here.
< Results are presented in Figure 1 . The x-axis records an increasing number of left-right statements in the selection; the y-axis charts parties' MRS.
< Including more culturally left-right statements allows a selection to more clearly link culturally left-wing voters to left-wing parties, right-wing voters to right-wing parties. But, adding more left-right statements does not manage at all to circumvent the fact that overall, due to the initially biased nature of the batch of statements, culturally left-wing parties had on average higher scores compared to right-wing parties.
Finally, we tested H3, thinking that the inclusion of more statements on issues owned by specific parties would increase those parties' scores more among voters who consider these issues to be important than among those who do not consider these issues important, and that this effect would increase as the number of statements on the owned issue increases. We ran the regressions separately for each party that had a clear ownership on an issue-more than 
Discussion and Conclusion
Our goal was to examine whether statement selection in VAAs systematically alters which parties are 'recommended' to which voters. We moved beyond Walgrave and colleagues (2009) by disaggregating the effect of statement selection: Are specific parties (dis)advantaged by including or excluding specific statements? And, are some statement selections better than others in connecting voters to parties that 'should' be close to them? Our benchmark was based on the proximity left-right voting model. We also tested whether the inclusion of salience into the calculation generated results in line with the salience/issue ownership model.
Overall, we found that the output resembles the proximity left-right model. However, the salience aspect has unexpected consequences. The hypothesis regarding issueownership/salience was rejected while three of the four hypotheses based on the proximity left-right model received support.
Statement selection matters, and it matters according to the logic of the proximity model. The more the statements included in a VAA are situated on an underlying dimension-in this study, particularly the cultural left-right dimension-the greater the likelihood that parties with a clear profile on that dimension get high scores. Also, the more statements are included on a given dimension, the more voters with a clear position on that dimension get the advice to vote for a party with a similar position on that dimension. This pattern corresponds with findings of Wagner and Ruusuvirta (2012) that increasing the number of statements covering an issue is almost never detrimental. The more politics is 'dimensionalized' for both parties and voters and the more a VAA taps into these dimensions, the more valid the voting advice it produces.
However, even though our models were able to predict some of the variance between statement selections, they were unable to account for the majority of between-selection variance. Either our expectations neglect factors that are important for the effect of statement selection, or many of the effects of statement selection are essentially random. Our analysis does not allow for a definite answer to this question, but our sense is that the latter is probably true and that many of the effects of statement selection are random, or at least exceedingly hard to predict. to the importance not only of the statement selection itself, but also of formulating statements according to standard practice in surveys-by avoiding double-barreledness, for example (Gemenis, 2013) .
Secondly, including more statements increases a VAA's accuracy. The plots showed that more statements on the left-right dimension makes VAAs better able to connect voters with parties in a meaningful way (see also Wagner and Ruusuvirta 2012) . How many statements are needed is a tricky question, though. There is no hard and fast way to ascertain the minimum threshold. However, there is one certainty: the more parties there are, the greater the number of statements needed to enable a VAA to meaningfully discern between parties. A comparative study of 27 VAAs yielded large differences in the number of statements included-the lowest number of statements was 18, the highest 75, and most use between 30 and 40 statements (Van Camp, Lefevere and Walgrave, forthcoming). In terms of measurement, more statements are never a bad thing, but there are practical considerations.
More statements may reduce participation because users are turned off by the lengthy questionnaire. This brings us back to the core of our paper: there are unavoidable trade-offs regarding statement selection. Increasing the number of statements on one dimension or issue inevitably decreases the number of statements on others. Statement selection of statements is a balancing act without clear guidelines.
Our study yielded other interesting findings. When statements regarding specific dimensions increase in number, VAAs become more disadvantageous for center-parties. In contrast, extreme parties tend to benefit when dimensional statements are added. Centerparties, by definition, do not hold extreme positions and pay the price when a certain dimension prevails in the selection. A second finding, probably most challenging for VAA builders, is that there probably is an inevitable initial bias in any batch of policy statements. In the Belgian VAA we studied here, center-left socialist and social-progressive parties received high scores regardless of statement selection, while the extreme-right received low scores.
Almost all VAAs based on this initial batch of statements would boost some parties and pull down others. In our case some of the selections dampened this effect, but no selection was able to compensate for it entirely. This 'skew' in the initial batch is not necessarily problematic: some parties may have more popular stances than others. But VAA builders should be aware of this by directly assessing public opinion via a survey before making a final selection.
We also tested whether VAAs' output conforms to what one would expect on the basis of saliency/issue-ownership theory, and the results strongly suggest that it does not. Parties whose 'owned' issues are amply covered in VAAs do not get a generally more favorable output, and even for voters who care more about a party's owned issues, party support is not associated with a large number of statements dealing with the issue. The reverse seems to be true. Parties are disadvantaged when 'their' issues are prominently present in a VAA.
The culprit, we think, is that VAA statements are drafted not only to be representative for the policy space but also to distinguish parties from one another. Statements sometimes cover policy positions on which one party-often the issue owner-takes a divergent position.
Oftentimes this is an unpopular position resulting in worse scores for the issue owner.
Especially for smaller, niche parties, statements on their core issues most likely cover unpopular policy positions, since including these statements allows VAAs to differentiate these parties. For example, the evidence we used here included a statement asking whether car gas should become more expensive (CO 2 tax). Undoubtedly, agreeing with the statement is the more unpopular stance, but the issue owner (Green party) nevertheless adopted it. The fact that VAA builders incorporate party salience into their calculations exacerbates this effect because the disadvantageous statement gets greater weight in the calculation for the owner. In other words, the statement selection criteria of representativeness and discriminating power are at odds with each other, and the discrimination criterion tends to disadvantage the issue owner. Discriminating power is a more important criterion for statement selection in crowded party systems so this last problem may be typical for VAAs in countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, or Switzerland.
This brings us to the weaknesses of our study. It draws on one country only, and on a single batch of fifty statements. Can we generalize our findings beyond the case of Do the Vote Test in Belgium? We cannot know for sure. Yet, the problems and trade-offs we highlighted in this paper also confront any other VAA and apply to any statement selection process. Any set of VAA statements probably suffers from an initial skew; in any kind of VAA, defining dimensions and attributing statements to dimensions favors parties with extreme positions on this dimension; the requirement of having discriminating statements probably disadvantages the issue-owners in all VAAs; and so on. The specific impact will differ, of course, but the general tendencies are probably the same. Our data were unique in the sense that we had evidence that included more statements than a typical VAA contains and that we had public opinion data that allowed us to directly test whether statement selection makes a difference. We call for more work using similar designs.
One further limitation caused by the single-case nature of our study is that we cannot draw conclusions about the impact of the number of parties on the findings reported here.
From both a theoretical and technical point of view we expect that in less densely populated party systems it is easier for a VAA to meaningfully match voters to parties. In multiparty systems the distinctions between parties are often small, whereas in two party systems the parties differ on many issues.
In conclusion, our evidence and analysis suggest that VAA builders should take particular care in selecting both their initial batch and their final selection of statements.
Although the whole process of building a VAA may seem systematic and 'scientific'-especially if the calculation of the score for each party for a given user is done very carefully-the crucial selection of statements is mostly an unsystematic, not very transparent, and unreplicable process. This is awkward, as statement selection is definitely the most important and consequential aspect of the VAA building effort. This paper may contribute in turning it into a more conscious and systematic activity. Minimally, field-testing a given statement selection before going public should be standard practice. Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001 28 Trucks can never pass cars on the highway. 0 0 29 Gasoline and diesel should become more expensive through a CO2-tax.
-1 -1 30 The Belgian nuclear power plants have to close from 2015 onwards.
-1 0 31 Unemployment benefits have to be limited in time. 0 1 32 If you have never worked, you cannot get an unemployment benefit. 0 1 33 Unemployment benefits should only be paid by the government, not the unions. 0 1 34 The limitations on night-and weekend work should be lifted. 0 1 35 Wearing a head kerchief behind the counter in the town hall should be forbidden. 1 0 36 Declined asylum seekers that are integrated, should be allowed to stay in Belgium.
-1 0 37 We must be allowed to use real-life tests to be able to prove racism.
-1 0 38 It should become harder to obtain the Belgian nationality. 1 0 39 Immigrants that have come here because of family reunification cannot have other relatives transferred here.
1 0 40 Belgium must again allow immigrants in to fill gaps in the labor market.
-1 0 41 Turkey should be able to become a member of the European Union.
-1 0 42 Together with a small group of other countries, Belgium should proceed towards more European integration. 
